Deception is commonly seen in everyday social interactions. However, most of the knowledge about the underlying neural mechanism of deception comes from studies where participants were instructed when and how to lie. To study spontaneous deception, we designed a guessing game modeled after Greene and Paxton (2009) ''Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(30), 12506-12511'', in which lying is the only way to achieve the performance level needed to end the game. We recorded neural responses during the game using near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS). We found that when compared to truth-telling, spontaneous deception, like instructed deception, engenders greater involvement of such prefrontal regions as the left superior frontal gyrus. We also found that the correct-truth trials produced greater neural activities in the left middle frontal gyrus and right superior frontal gyrus than the incorrect-truth trials, suggesting the involvement of the reward system. Furthermore, the present study confirmed the feasibility of using NIRS to study spontaneous deception.
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Introduction
Deception is common in our everyday lives (DePaulo et al., 2003) . It occurs in politics, business, diplomacy, sports, friendships, and even family relationships. Extensive behavioral research has been devoted to examining deception in adults and children (Crossman & Lewis, 2006; Fu & Lee, 2007; Talwar & Lee, 2008; Xu, Bao, Fu, Talwar, & Lee, 2010) . With technological improvements in recent decades, it is now possible to use various new imaging tools to study the neural mechanisms of deception (for reviews, see Abe, 2011; Christ, Van Essen, Watson, Brubaker, & McDermott, 2009) .
One of the most prevalent paradigms used in neuroimaging studies of deception is the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT). The GKT is a test of prior knowledge of event details that would be known only to a person involved in the event. By comparing the person's different responses between deceptive and control items, one can glean behavioral, physiological, or neural markers of deception (Gamer, Klimecki, Bauermann, Stoeter, & Vossel, 2009 ). Most of the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies using GTK have found deception-related activities in the frontal cortex, such as the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), regardless of differences in task demands. For example, Langleben et al. (2002) asked participants to hide a card in their pockets and then to deny the possession of the card. They found increased activity in the superior frontal gyrus (SFG) and ACC when deceptive responses were contrasted with truthful responses.
In addition to GKT, other paradigms have been developed. Ganis, Kosslyn, Stose, Thompson, and Yurgelun-Todd (2003) asked participants to generate lies based on rehearsed and unrehearsed false information related to their past autobiographic experiences. Both types of lies elicited more activations than truth-telling in the bilateral anterior prefrontal cortices. Nuñ ez, Casey, Egner, Hare, and Hirsch (2005) asked participants to perform a yes/no memory test for autobiographical knowledge (e.g., 'Can you ride a bicycle?') as well as for non-autobiographical knowledge (e.g., 'Is New York City in Ohio?'). They found increased activity associated with lying relative to truth-telling in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and ACC. Recently, Abe et al. (2008) conducted an fMRI experiment to explore the specificity of prefrontal activity in intentional deception, and confirmed that prefrontal activity was specifically associated with 
